Middle Eastern Studies ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: https://tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20 Imagining modernity: the language and genealogy of modernity in nineteenth-century Arabic Wael Abu-ʿUksa To cite this article: Wael Abu-ʿUksa (2019) Imagining modernity: the language and genealogy of modernity in nineteenth-century Arabic, Middle Eastern Studies, 55:5, 671-682, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2019.1574759 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1574759 Published online: 30 Apr 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 46 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fmes20 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 2019, VOL. 55, NO. 5, 671–682 https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1574759 Imagining modernity: the language and genealogy of modernity in nineteenth-century Arabic ( Wael Abu- Uksa Department of Political Science and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for The Advancement of Peace, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel In his defense of the Enlightenment against assaults made by postmodernists, social theorist J€ urgen Habermas draws the general outlines of the condition of modernity. He states that modernity consists of ongoing attempts to develop objective sciences, autonomous art and universal foundations of morality and law. Releasing the cognitive potential that lies in these fields and applying it to the practical aspects of life creates what modernity is – a consistent rationalization of social relations. Although this paradigm underwent a profound crisis and was the subject of fading faith in its emancipatory potential, Habermas insists on defending its utopia. At the end of one of his famous essays, he concludes that we should learn from the mistakes that accompanied modernity rather than abandon it entirely, perceiving it as an ‘unfinished project’.1 Despite the Western context of Habermas’s argument, in his essay he recognizes the universal aspect of the idea of modernity. Similarly, the critique of modernity in non-Western contexts acquired a variety of particular contextual characteristics. Focusing on the study of the Middle East, modernity has been the subject of scholarly works, many of which are situated in two theoretical categories. The first consists of works relying on positivist approaches that regard modernity as a Western phenomenon that extended to non-Western civilizations. Based on this theoretical premise, the triumph of modern ideas in non-Western civilizations is interpreted as a process of Westernization that eventually yields a universal, hegemonic model. These works rely on the assumption of tension or incompatibility between ‘Western’ modernity and Arab Islamic civilization and interpret the evolvement of modern ideas in Arab Islamic culture through use of terms such as ‘adoption’. Such terms imply that modern ideas were transferred from their authentic environment (i.e. the West) to an essentially foreign and usually hostile cultural sphere (i.e. Islamic civilization). These researchers conceptualize the failure of any modern idea – democracy, liberalism, representation and so on – in Arab Islamic societies as resulting from the assumed tension of incompatibility of ‘Western’ ideas with local Islamic traditions and values. This theoretical approach has been articulated by prominent scholars – historians of the Middle East, political scientists and many others.2 The second theoretical category consists of works influenced by postmodern and postcolonial theories. This approach understands Arab modernity through concepts such as ‘imitation’, contending that Arab modernity is an imperial legacy, a Western model that was fundamentally transformed during a period in which Islam was under pressure from Western imperialism. This orientation identifies Enlightenment universalism with Western imperialism, without any real attempt to disassociate between the two, reducing the historical substance of Arab modernity to the context of the historical period that witnessed the expansion of imperialism. This category includes prominent scholars such as Edward Said, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi and many others.3 ( CONTACT Wael Abu- Uksa wabu@mail.huji.ac.il ß 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 672 ( W. ABU- UKSA In their ideational structure these two theoretical approaches conceive the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ as consistently contesting essences, perceiving them in ontological terms as natural and ahistorical, and their encounter is portrayed through the concept of the will to power. Current works on the history of modern ideas almost entirely ignore the historical, semantic and political shifts of these categories; the transitions from the medieval, theological ‘abode of Islam’ (dar al-Islam) to the modern terms the ‘East’, the ‘Arab world’ or the ‘Islamic World’ and from ‘Christendom’ to the modern term the ‘West’ have not been adequately explored.4 Although this last subject falls beyond the scope of this article, this historicist line of thought will be at the core of the following analysis. In this article I will challenge these two prominent theories by using conceptual history as a tool to purvey an alternative theoretical framework for understanding modernity in the Arabic context and its critique.5 In the light of current scholarship on modern ideas in the Arab Islamic context, this approach has a qualitative contribution: to transform the common perception of Arab Islamic modernity as being in the ahistorical realm and place it in the historical domain. The theoretical method for implementing this orientation is through the exploration of and emphasis on the connection between the history of ideas and the history of language. Replacing essentialist and ahistorical questions about what is Western and what is Islamic or what is modern and what is authentic, the following historicist approach focuses on questions that restrict the historical analysis to temporalities of the historical condition: what terms did Arabic-speaking scholars use to imagine modernity in the nineteenth century? When, how, and in what context was the language of modernity constructed, contested and made relevant to contemporary circumstances? The next sections investigate modernity through its linguistic aspects during the historical moment of its formation. Thus, the discussion will focus on this concept in relation to the first generation of Arabic-speaking scholars in the nineteenth century. Arab modernity is scrutinized synchronically, exploring it in relation to other temporal structures, and diachronically, by revealing its complex structure, which involves reworking local medieval traditions, relating them to nineteenth-century reformulations that purvey the scope of expectations related to the future. In that sense, conceptual history will ask to emphasize two neglected aspects of the meaning of Arab modernity in the scholarship: the role of the past and the role of the future on the formation of its temporal structure. This approach challenges the prevalent perception that sees Arab modernity mainly through the prism of the synchronic historical dynamic that involves imperialism and Westernization.6 Language of modernity: anatomy, meaning and semantic scope Nineteenth-century Arabic-speaking scholars imagined modernity through use of the term tamaddun (civilization, imagined high model of civilization, being civilized, urbanization).7 During this period tamaddun was constructed as a comprehensive theory that comprised all aspects of human life: ethical, religious, social, economic, political and cultural. The authors who employed this term assumed that societies that implement or achieve advanced positions in the continuous linear improvement of civilization are conceived of as being more advanced than others. The world’s nations were categorized by the type of movement they practiced: forward, to higher stages of development (sustained progress), retreating toward the past (regression) or maintaining a static state (traditional). The nineteenth-century concept of tamaddun embedded the idea of progress. Rizq Allah Hassun (d. 1880), founder of the first private Arabic newspaper, articulated the intimate link between the two ideas with the phrase ‘progress for the sake of civilization’ (al-taqaddum fi sabil al-tamaddun).8 The discourse of civilization extended in many directions, shaping a subversive worldview that conceived the idea of change as a positive value. Nineteenth-century progressive MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 673 scholars believed that the progress of civilization as it was articulated in the term tamaddun would lead eventually to a state of perfection (kamal), both individually and socially. The formation of tamaddun as a comprehensive theory in the first half of the nineteenth century had repercussions on Arabic social and political discourse. The rise of tamaddun was contested during this period by the concept of tradition. (Ahmad) Faris ( al-Shidyaq, one of the pioneers of Arabic journalism, wrote during the 1860s that ‘tradition [ ada] and civilization [tamaddun] often challenge each other in the arena of time, and one obtains victory over the other’.9 This perception, which was based on imagining a conflict between a high model of ‘civilization’ and ‘tradition’, was sustained by concepts of legitimacy and authority. The resulting theoretical tension drew the main currents of intellectual life in the Ottoman regions into conflict; the proponents of tamaddun considered traditional restraints to be obstacles to progress, and they acted as social agents in charge of criticizing contemporary reality, leading society toward social and political betterment. Lexical and scholarly works written in the nineteenth century documented the extended semantics of tamaddun, giving it various definitions and interpretations. In Butrus al-Bustani’s dictionary, composed in the 1860s, tamaddun is used as an adjective for mankind, indicating ‘becoming urban’ and ‘acquiring the civility and politeness of the city’ (urbanity), stressing the transition to an urban lifestyle as was sustained in cities (urbanization). Additionally, it indicates the transformation from the state of barbarism and ignorance to the state of civilization and knowledge.10 This last definition had a theoretical aspect that embedded the idea of transformation. In the interpretation of tamaddun most frequently repeated among nineteenth-century scholars was the following: tamaddun is ( acquiring the methods that are required for improving the conditions of sedentary people [ahl al- umran]. This means improving their ethics and customs, acquiring perfection in education [kamal al-tarbiyya], and stimulating them to gain virtue, social and political perfection [al-kamalat al-madaniyya], and elevation of their prosperity.11 The source of this interpretation, in which Arabic-speaking scholars imagined, articulated and understood the meaning of modernity, has medieval roots. What follows is a diachronic and contextual look at this concept. Genealogy of tamaddun The term that Arabic used to imagine the condition of modernity, tamaddun, was not coined in the nineteenth century. Although its use prior to that time was extremely rare, it appeared in early traditions as an idea with embedded theoretical structures. The intensive theorization and use of this term took place mainly among the falasifa (Arabic-speaking philosophers) in the Middle Ages.12 This group of scholars followed Greek philosophy in their conceptualization of man’s state as being social and political in nature. Stemming from this perspective, words derived from the root m.d.n. were most frequently formed and used in social and political contexts: madina was used as equivalent to the Greek polis and politeia (city-state and regime) and madani (pl. madaniyyin) as equivalent ( to polities (citizen or statesman). ( Many other forms of the word indicated political aspects: sina a madaniyya (political art), jama a madaniyya (political community) and many others.13 Compared to the nineteenth-century perception of tamaddun, these words and phrases reached a high level of sophistication through their employment in a theory of civilization that demarcated a dichotomy between two historical states: high, signed by ‘civility’ and, low, signed by ‘savagery’. This theory had already appeared in the works of the tenth-century philosopher ( Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 950). Al-Farabi argued that the political society (al-ijtima al-madani) is the supreme type of social organization and that human organization consists of many types – some are sociopolitical (mudun) and some are not (laysu madaniyyin). He drew hierarchical relations 674 ( W. ABU- UKSA between them: the highest form, which he called al-madina al-fadila (the virtuous state), became the title of one of his most famous works. He designated the people living in this high form of organization as ‘civilized and referred to individuals living in nonpolitical ) people’ (madaniyyin) ) organizations as baha im unsiyya and baha im wahshiyya (human beasts or savage people).14 In his theory, the high or low ranking of social organization is contingent upon the value of sociopolitical association, the acquisition of the common good, and virtue. Despite the fact that alFarabi had a very sophisticated view of the link between sociopolitical organization and the moral and political conditions of societies, as articulated in the various forms of the word m.d.n., he did not explicitly use the term tamaddun. The early extensive theoretical construction of tamaddun appeared a few decades after alFarabi in the works of the philosopher Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030). In ( two works, Kitab al-fawz al-asghar (The lesser victory) and Tahdib al-akhlaq wa-tathir al-a raq (Cultivation of morals and purity of dispositions) he theorized tamaddun as part of his Neoplatonist cosmology. In these two works, especially the latter, character traits are what distinguishes between human beings and animals and between different ranks of human beings.15 He demarcates the ranks of civilizations by contrasting between the terms tamaddun (a high form of civilization) and tawahhush (savagery).16 His theory consists of hierarchic stages that classify creatures in general and human individuals and cultures in particular: the highest stage is the rational, which gives human beings their human characteristics (martaba insaniyya), and the lowest is the animal, or instinctive, stage (bahimiyya). Human beings might refine their character and evolve (taraqqi) to enter the highest stage, which endows them with perfect happiness (al( sa id al-kamil) and superiority over other creatures, or they might choose to deteriorate to the lowest category, the instinctive faculty of the soul, which comprises humans of poor intellect. For human beings the transition between these stages was, to a large extent, regarded as a matter of free choice. This perception of civilization is embedded in Ibn Miskawayh’s Neoplatonic cosmological theory: character moves in two directions, upward toward reason, where happiness and rational existence lie (active intellect), or downward (toward matter). Thus, humanism (insaniyya) as a noble quality depends on the rate of rationality among different human beings.17 This theory of civilization is more comprehensive than al-Farabi’s, but it is nevertheless based on al-Farabi’s interpretation of ranks as determined by rational qualities. In Ibn Miskawayh’s works the motion between stages of development is contingent upon the form of sociopolitical organization. This is the logic underlying the justification of the necessity of the state. His concept of tamaddun, in this respect, also embeds a theory on good governance, in which the ruler has a special obligation: he should lead his people toward knowledge and ‘induce every person to seek his own particular happiness’.18 Additionally, tamaddun had social implications related to society and sociability. Ibn Miskawayh expounds Aristotle’s argument that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ thus:19 Man, of all the animals, cannot attain his perfection by himself alone. He must have recourse to the help of a great number of people in order to achieve a good life and follow the right path. This is why the philosophers have said: Man is a civic being by nature. This means that he needs to live in a city with a large population in order to achieve human happiness.20 In medieval Arabic, civic life (madani) has both political and social meaning. Man needs to be organized politically and socially and needs to cooperate with others in society to acquire noble qualities such as temperance, intrepidness, generosity and justice. Civic life is a condition for human perfection and happiness, which are the goals of tamaddun.21 This definition, which was later used by nineteenth-century scholars to formulate their perception of modernity, had, then, deep roots in this philosophical tradition that perceived reason as a main condition for the cultivation, improvement, and refinement of the human ethical and rational state. Tamaddun is a process of cultivating individuals’ rational capacities through the MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 675 acquisition of knowledge, which is necessary for gaining theoretical and practical perfection. This process has a social goal: the development of sociopolitical (civic) organization that concerns the evolvement of society as a whole.22 In modern terms Ibn Miskawayh’s theory of tamaddun consists of a program for the rationalization of individuals and societies. In his thought the prominent capacity of reason as a source of knowledge, even in relation to revelation, brought a later scholar, Muhammad Arkoun, to argue that Ibn Miskawayh and his generation had created an early tradition of humanism.23 Ibn Miskawayh had served under the Persian Buwayhids in Rayy and Baghdad as a courtier and librarian, among other positions, and when he wrote his theory of tamaddun, he probably did not have in mind only the population of these two cities. His philosophy has a universal message that concerns Muslims and non-Muslims. To a large extent, his philosophy marked the flourishing of Islamic rationalism in an age that witnessed the rise of ( Shi ism in Iraq (the Buwayhids), in parts of Greater Syria, and in Egypt (the Fatimids).24 Many of the medieval scholars, philosophers25 and antiphilosophers were influenced by certain aspects of Ibn Miskawayh’s theory of civilization. The idea regarding the importance of maintaining social ties as a necessity for acquiring the common good was used by prominent critics of philosophy. Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who was acquainted with the philosophical traditions and systematically refuted ( the arguments of the falasifa, wrote about this ( idea in his prominent treatise al-Siyasa al-shar iyya (Governance in accordance with the shari a). There Ibn Taymiyya asserts that ‘the [common] interest of men can be achieved only through social association, because of their need for each other’.26 He argues for the necessity of state and political leaders to sustain society and maintain the rules of Islam, emphasizing the role of the state in checking violent passions and in cultivating behaviors and ethics.27 Compared to the falasifa, Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of social organization is particular to Islamic societies, and it is not embedded in theories of nature or motion. The linguistic aspect of this difference is articulated ( in the words he chooses to capture his theme: he uses the word ijtima (human association), not tamaddun. The most prominent pre-nineteenth-century scholar to write about the theory of civilization without being identified with the falasifa was Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). In his famous alMuqaddima, Ibn Khaldun contends that the history of civilization consists of two pillars: the first and lowest being the bedouin and ‘savage’ (tawahhush) state and the highest being the stage of hadara (sedentary culture). According to his theory, history is a repeated process that moves constantly in a circular motion between these points. In the highest form (hadara), rulers forget their desert life and toughness and lose their group feeling – a state that eventually brings about the destruction of( their dynasty.28 In his definition of the concept, Ibn Khaldun indicates that civilization (hadara, umran) means that human beings have to dwell in common and settle together in cities and hamlets for the comforts of companionship and for the satisfaction of human needs, as a result of the natural disposition of human beings toward co-operation in order to be able to make a living.29 Diverging from the philosophers who( frequently used words derived from m.d.n., Ibn Khaldun signified civilization primarily by using umran and hadara. These two words, especially the former, became more closely identified with his work than tamaddun, which he used less frequently. The three emphasize different things: while ( tamaddun is defined in contrast to nonsocial and nonpolitical organization, the meaning of umran and hadara are defined in contrast to the material aspects of civilization (buildings, cities, settled and urban life). These differences, however, are not only semantic. In addition to its concrete meaning, tamaddun embeds a concept of motion and time (being civilized, to become socially and politically organized). In this regard there is a fundamental difference between the theories of the philosophers and that of Ibn Khaldun; while in the latter’s view, time and the history of civilization are determinist and constantly move in a circular motion (all civilizations that rise must eventually decline), these aspects are different among the falasifa. In Ibn Miskawayh’s theory, individuals can reach an 676 ( W. ABU- UKSA advanced stage of development or deteriorate back to a lower state. In this case the determinism of history as it appears in Ibn Khaldun’s theory is irrelevant; instead, the idea of free will has a prominent role. These cosmological and theological perceptions, which are embedded in the Neoplatonic philosophy of metaphysics, were rejected by all critics of the philosophers, including Ibn Khaldun, as is articulated in his critique of the philosophers’ concept of siyasa madaniyya (management in accordance with political philosophy).30 Moreover, the most prominent difference between the theory of the philosophers in relation to others is the pivotal capacity of reason in the evolvement of high forms of civilization. The philosophers’ strong disposition toward rationalization, including in their concept of metaphysics and religion, created great dissonance with all the theological ( schools in Sunni Islam. Thus, for instance, Ibn Miskawayh’s rationalization of the function of shari a, public prayer, and pilgrimage to Mecca, in which he argued that these principles sustain sociability and civilization (tamaddun), ignited the response of the famous theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who argued that these practices should be performed simply because they are part of religion, and not for any other reason.31 As far as I have been able to determine, the small amount of scholarly work done on the origins of the concept of tamaddun attribute this concept to Ibn Khaldun without emphasizing the strong link its linguistic and theoretical aspects have with the rationalist tradition of falsafa.32 The rediscovery of tamaddun: historical context of the emergence of the language of modernity Despite the fact that the term tamaddun was rarely employed in texts outside of the philosophical corpus prior to the nineteenth century, it came into considerable use among nineteenth-century scholars. The construction of the modern concept of tamaddun in the nineteenth century was influenced directly by the rediscovery of the relevance of these philosophical medieval social and political conceptions. In the light of the nineteenth-century idea of progress, societies and states were no longer perceived as static; historical time is always in motion, and societies must adapt themselves to variable contexts and environments. The desire to understand the rapid changes brought about great interest in the philosophy of history. The nineteenth-century meaning of tamaddun merged with the content of ‘progress’ (taqaddum), which was less relevant to medieval writings;33 while the former defined the high state of being, the aim of the theory of civilization, the latter provided an imagined perception of time – the direction civilization should take to achieve its ultimate aim. The earliest nineteenth-century reformulation of tamaddun was presented in the late 1820s by the Egyptian Muslim scholar ( Rifa a al-Tahtawi. Many events came into play in the reworking of this concept: the emergence of the centralized bureaucratic state in the Middle East, the expansion of Egypt and its transformation into an imperial power, the European imperialist movement, the rise of print industries, and the intensive universal cultural encounters these changes facilitated. This ( was manifested in two prominent events that took place in the 1820s. Muhammad (or Mehmet) Ali’s military campaigns, which gave evidence of his ambition to establish a centralized state and an independent dynasty in Egypt, eventually reached their peak with the Ottoman-Egyptian war and the Egyptian invasion of Greater Syria in 1831. The other face of this ambition was the belief that acquiring European sciences (would improve the Egyptian state’s capabilities and bureaucracy. To effect this, Muhammad Ali sent the first formal education missions to France in the 1820s. It is therefore not surprising that the early theorization and reuse of tamaddun in the nineteenth century appeared in the famous description of al-Tahtawi’s journey to Paris (published in 1834). Al-Tahtawi argues that there are three main universal stages of civilization: savage nations, barbaric nations and civilized nations. He classified the inhabitants of the ‘regions of the blacks’ (bilad al-sudan) in the first category, the Bedouin in the second, and the inhabitants of Egypt, MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 677 Greater Syria, North Africa, eastern and western Europe, and most of ‘the regions of America’ in the third. Al-Tahtawi believed that the highest ‘perfect civilized state’ (kamal al-tamaddun) and the perfectibility of humanity are possible in the earthly state. In addition to his universal classification, criteria and principles that constitute the idea of progress acquired Islamic particularity.34 Al-Tahtawi’s criteria for the advancement of society pertain to the acquisition of scientific knowledge in both the religious and the nonreligious sciences.35 It is important to note that the contrast here is not between Bedouin and sedentary people, as in Ibn Khaldun’s theory. Furthermore, in his early works al-Tahtawi did not mention the origins of his concept of high civilization or the names of any of the falasifa.36 There is reason to believe that this was because of the common negative connotation this tradition had at the time. Early nineteenth-century scholars critical approach by depicting philoso) generally followed al-Ghazali’s )( phers – falasifa, hukama – using the terms taba i iyya (naturalists) and dahrriyya (earthly, materialist), connoting atheist or infidel beliefs.37 Not mentioning the names of these philosophers, however, did not hide falsafa’s strong influence on al-Tahtawi. Many of the ideas that were clearly identified with the particular tradition of falsafa were reused in his works. In the early 1830s al-Tahtawi’s use of al-Farabi’s concept of alsiyasa al-madaniyya (civil governance, governance based on political philosophy) and his extensive use of the definition of the state as a political organism consisting of members acting together in harmonic, hierarchic order leave no doubt about his acquaintance with some of the theories of the falasifa.38 Despite the fact that there is no clear reference to Ibn Miskawayh’s works, a close look at al-Tahtawi’s writings makes his use of and admiration ( for Ibn Miskawayh’s ideas obvious. In his Manahij al-albab al-misriyya fi mabahij al-adab al- asriyya (The paths of Egyptian minds in the joys of modern manners),39 al-Tahtawi makes extensive use of Ibn Miskawayh’s Thadhib al-akhlaq, quoting and copying part of his texts without explicitly mentioning his name.40 Instead, al-Tahtawi refers his readers to ‘the author of the Akhlaq’.41 The revival of tamaddun and its reconstruction marked above all the return of philosophy to the fore in Arabic political discourse and with it the strong tendency toward rationalization. The animation of sovereign reason as a source of knowledge and legitimacy had an immense impact on the deepest levels of consciousness, including on the subjects of religious faith and identity. In this regard the modern content of tamaddun appeared in many variations that differ from the concept’s medieval meaning. These variants changed in accordance with the interpretation of the present (the way of progress) and the future expected model (the meaning of the high model of civilization). Al-Tahtawi argues that the authentic tamaddun consists of both a spiritual part (refinement of ethics, religion, manners, customs and so on) and a material part (development of industry, commerce, agriculture and so on).42 Despite his emphasis on the importance of rationalism, unlike Ibn Miskawayh, he did not believe in rationalism as an absolute source for the attainment of( tamaddun. He followed earlier theologians by arguing in favor of subordinating reason to shari(a: ‘People should be taught politics ( by the methods of divine law and not by pure reason [al- aql al-mujarad]’, stressing that shari a does not contradict the principle of benefiting from ‘positive’ innovations produced by reason.43 Others among the first generation in the nineteenth century to theorize tamaddun after al-Tahtawi preserved this subordination in their imagining the high form of civilization. The Christian journalist Butrus alBustani, like al-Tahtawi, presented two interpretations of the history of civilization, religious and nonreligious, and his perception of universalism was also impacted by Protestant theological convictions. He argued that the origins of the high model of civilization can be found in Christianity because Christianity brought and spread the idea that all men are born naturally equal and that they are part of one universal family, the human family.44 Similarly, the theorization of tamaddun in Francis al-Marrash’s Kitab ghabat al-haqq (The forest of truth) – apparently first published in 1865 in Aleppo – has religious roots. Al-Marrash articulates his theory through allegory: tamaddun is represented by the inevitable triumph of the ‘king of freedom’, who rules in the ‘kingdom of light’ over the ‘kingdom of slavery’ and savagery (tawahhush).45 678 ( W. ABU- UKSA The conflict between the two kingdoms represents al-Marrash’s optimistic belief in the idea of progress. This story was written under the shadow of the Ottoman reforms and the great expectations that accompanied it, especially after the religious clashes in Syria. The renewing element in al-Marrash’s story is the central character of the philosopher, who represents the authority of reason, the highest authority of knowledge in the kingdom of tamaddun. Like his Muslim and Christian contemporaries, al-Marrash never believed in absolute rationalism; instead he cultivated a notion of reformed religion, preserving it from subordination to reason.46 Advocating rationalism based on the metaphysics of nature (natural law and natural reason) took place with the second generation of the nineteenth century, especially with the works of the anticleric Adib Ishaq, who argued that ‘tamaddun is the application of individual freedom, cooperation, and the protection of the advancement of ethics and material aspects of society’ – with no reference to the values of a specific religion.47 These scholars and others from the same generation criticized variant theories of tamaddun that they considered ‘brutal’, ‘barbarian’ or ‘superficial’. In an essay he published in 1861, Faris al-Shidyaq criticized some of the ‘barbarian’ aspects of ‘civilized’ societies of Europe, while stressing the powerful) impact of tamaddun. He claimed that what Europeans call mutamaddin (civilized), meant muta dib (polite, having good manners) in Arabic.48 The conceptualization and imagination of modernity took place within this framework. The nineteenth-century forms of tamaddun filled many discursive functions. Given the then common contention that progress in the sciences was necessary to close the development gap that existed between the Ottoman Empire (including Egypt) and the European countries, use of this concept justified changes in the local body of knowledge and the acceptance of some of the European scientific disciplines. Al-Tahtawi advocated the idea of acculturation by contending that ‘he ( [Muhammad Ali] does this because of their [the Europeans’] human qualities and knowledge, and not because they are Christians’.49 Furthermore, the humanist and universal aspects of the discourse on tamaddun justified reformulating or breaking the psychological boundaries between the medieval theological concept of human association – dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) – and Christendom. The universal aspect of tamaddun was manifested in phrases such as ‘the age of civilization [al-tamaddun]’, which were used to designate nineteenth-century world history.50 The idea of tamaddun reached its highest politicization with its use for legitimizing changes that took place in many fields, such as education, culture, religion, law, identity and sociality. In education the construction of tamaddun was conducted in the context of the establishment of a state school system that functioned independently of the medieval madrasa (institution of religious education) and ultimately challenged the knowledge produced in the religious institutions. Belief in the power of education to refine the character of individuals became a cornerstone of the discourse on tamaddun. The two prominent progressive scholars of this age, al-Tahtawi and al-Bustani, were first of all educators. Progressive scholars assumed that enlightenment, which first of all involves education and the distribution of knowledge, is a precondition for tamaddun.51 Culturally, tamaddun denoted the extension of bourgeois culture and values from the capital city to the periphery – to the social organization of the town, the village and the bedouin tribe (urbanizing the periphery). Religiously, tamaddun ignited religious reform in Eastern Christianity (anticlericalism) and in Islam, accompanied by the request to institute laws that responded to the principles of the political civic community. On the individual social plane, (with tamaddun political and social identity became subject to redefinition and theorization. Rafa a alTahtawi and Butrus al-Bustani made significant contributions to the formation of the civic solidarity that was depicted by wataniyya (patriotism). Both scholars argued that tamaddun could be) achieved only through collective cooperation between all compatriots in a diverse society (abna al-watan).52 In general, the revival of the discourse on tamaddun in the context of state reforms (1839–1876) had a practical function: to legitimize the Tanzimat reforms in the eyes of its critics, especially the ‘traditional’ religious clerics.53 The clash with traditionalism extended to wider MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 679 social norms that fell under the pressure of the quest for emancipation, especially in relation to minorities. Contemporary scholars believed that the reforms would transform the Ottomans’ legal status from that of subjects to that of citizens, from being passive actors in conflicting religious groups to being political actors in a harmonious Ottoman civil community (the ideology of Ottomanism). In this context, the Aristotelian principle ‘man is a civic being by nature’ became, after al-Tahtawi wrote about it, the foundation of the progressive political philosophy in Arabic.54 In his Manahij al-Tahtawi revived the use of madina to denote a political organization (polity), reformulating the ancient medieval concept of political society and approaching it as a superior social organism. In this context al-Tahtawi coined the word watani, which meant someone who is rooted in a particular homeland, usually used as ( ‘native/citizen’ as opposed to ‘foreign’. This word suggests an alternative to the common ra iyya (subjects) when referring to the status of individuals in a polity. In the theoretical engagement with redefining communal borders, state, identity and ruler-ruled relations, watani was coined to express the aspect of rights that are derived from the legal affiliation to a certain political community (watan).55 In medieval philosophical works al-madina (polity) occupies the highest form of human organization, and progressive thinkers of the nineteenth century benefited from this philosophy in their theoretical construction of modern communities and states that would fulfill their expectations. In the progressive discourse of the nineteenth century, al-madina was no longer ascribed to the city-state but to the formative reality of the modern state in the Middle East. Conclusion Similar to Habermas’s description of modernity, linguistic analysis of tamaddun shows that Arabic-speaking scholars had, already in the nineteenth century, conceived the concept of modernity in terms of a project, suggesting various particular theories for obtaining its moral and material ideals. The aim of this inquiry is not to argue that the Europeans had no influence on the nineteenth-century concept of modernity in Arabic. Rather, this analysis is based on the contention that European influence on the Arabic concept has been overemphasized and has reached a high degree of theorization in a majority of the works written about Arabic modernity. Instead of this unbalanced understanding, this article argues that the construction of the concept of modernity in Arabic was deeply influenced by three integral components or time dimensions: the relation with the past, the historical context of the present and the scope of expectations related to the future. The focus of scholarship on the synchronic dimension of analysis and the scrutiny of modernity in the Arabic language primarily against the background of European imperialism without a deep examination of the impact of the other two dimensions largely determined the conclusion that modernity in this context is an ‘imitation’ of the ‘West’ or ‘adoption’ of its values. Moreover, the contention that the quest for constant rationalization, the prominent theoretical character of modernity, is primarily related to Western Enlightenment, as is presented by Orientalists and anti-Orientalist scholarship, is no more accurate. The history of tamaddun emphasizes the oversimplification of these contentions. It illustrates that the concept used by Arabic-speaking scholars to imagine their modernity was not invented in the nineteenth century; tamaddun was recalled from the past, reworked in the present to resolve contemporary challenges, and infused by ideational content formulated in the light of a future imagined model of high civilization and human perfection. The history of tamaddun elucidates both the local roots of rationalization and the dynamics it generated in local culture, in the present and in the past, and thus reveals the direct connection between the intellectual history of the nineteenth century (the period known as the nahda, revival) and intellectual discussions and disputes that had previously erupted in Arabic civilization. The argument that the contentions modernity generated have local roots has far-reaching implications and gives us a more accurate look at the ( W. ABU- UKSA 680 construction, the success and failure, and the critique of modern ideas in the Arabic-speaking world. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. J. Habermas, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’ in M.P. d’Entr eves and S. Benhabib (eds), Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp.38–55. For selected example, see Samuel Huntington who assumes that the conflict between civilizations flows from their ‘nature’, arguing that Islam and the West are fundamentally different. He portrays Islam as a medieval religion and depicts any manifestation of modernity in Islamic civilization as ‘Westernization’, emphasizing its foreign sources. See S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996). For selected examples, see Edward Said’s critique on Arab thought. He stresses the unequal relations between modern Arab thought and imperialism, arguing that the state of the relations between the Arab intelligentsia and the West is a manifestation of the triumph of Orientalism. Similarly, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi criticizes Arab liberalism, stating that it is a ‘cheap imitation’ of Western liberalism. See E. Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2004), pp.323–324; I. Abu-Rabi, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2004), p.74. It is worth noting that in his monumental work Albert Hourani follows the common theories of modernity that dominated the fields of humanities and social sciences at the time his book was published (1962). Hourani describes modernity as a process of Westernization with very little sensitivity ascribed to the historicity of concepts of civilization and their transformations. For selected examples, see A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.41, 44, 62, 68, 80. Many recent publications that use a variety of theoretical approaches other than conceptual history have presented a critical reading of common perceptions of Arab modernity in the scholarship. For selected works, see T. El-Ariss, Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013); S.M. Tageldin, Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011); M. Booth, Classes of Ladies of Cloistered Spaces: Writing Feminist History Through Biography in Fin-de-Siecle Egypt (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); S. Selim, The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt, 1880-1985 (London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); L. Levy, ‘The Nahda and the Haskala: A Comparative Reading of “Revival” and “Reform”’, Middle Eastern Literatures Vol.16, No. 3 (2013), pp.300–16; I. Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010); S. Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2009); M. Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014). For a comprehensive account of published literature on Arab modernity, see J. Hanssen and M. Weiss (eds), Language, Mind, Freedom and Time: The Modern Arab Intellectual Tradition in Four Words in Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Toward an Intellectual History of the Nahda (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.1–37. Although employing a different theoretical approach, Tarek El-Ariss criticizes the two prevalent perceptions of Arab modernity that are discussed in this article: the perspective that perceives it as a Western imperial project and the postcolonial aspect that reduces the understanding of modern texts to the politics of colonialism. El-Ariss, Trials of Arab Modernity, pp.1–18. For several academic publications addressing some aspects of this concept, see B. Schaebler, Civilizing Others: Global Modernity and Local Boundaries (French/German and Ottoman and Arab) of Savagery in B. Schaebler and L. Stenberg (eds), Globalization and the Muslim World: Culture, Religion, and Modernity (New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp.3–31; B. Benlahcene, ‘Civilization in the Western and Islamic Cultural Traditions: A Conceptual Historical Approach’, Social and Human Sciences Review Vol. 15 (2006), pp. 49–64; F. Zachs, ‘Cultural and Conceptual Contributions of Beiruti Merchants to the Nahda’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient Vol. 55 (2012), pp. 153–82; O. Bashkin ‘Journeys between Civility and Wilderness: Debates on Civilization and Emotions in the Arab Middle East, 1861–1939’ in Margrit Pernau, Helge Jordheim et al. (eds), Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth-Century Asia and Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), ) pp. 126–45; El-Ariss, Trials of Arab Modernity, pp. 53–87. Mir at al-Ahwal, 22 March 1877. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 681 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. A.F. al-Shidyaq, Mukhtarat min Athar Ahmad Faris al) Shidyaq (Beirut: al-Mu assasa al-Sharqiyya lil-Nashr, 2001), p. 163. For selected examples of the use of tamaddun as meaning ‘becoming urban, urbanization’, see B. al-Bustani, Tamaddun in Muhit al-Muhit (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnan, 1998), p.843; J. Antaki ‘al-Tamaddun wal-Jahl’, al-Jinan Vol. 18 (1870), pp.600–602. ( This quotation is taken from Rifa a al-Tahtawi, but its content is repeated in the ( works of many ( contemporary scholars. R.R. ( ( al-Tahtawi, ‘Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wal-Banin’ in M. Imara (ed.), al-A mal al-Kamila liRifa a Rafi al-Tahtawi, Vol. 2 (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, ) 2010), p.501; B. al-Bustani, ) Nafir Suriyya (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, ( 1990),) pp.63–8; A.F. al-Shidyaq, Kanz al-Ragha ib fi Muntakhabat al-Jawa ib, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Matba ( at alJawa ib, 1871), p.3; Al-Tahtawi, Kitab al-Murshid( al-Amin, pp.351, 501; R.R. al-Tahtawi, trans. Al-Ta ( ribat alShafiya li-Murid al-Jughrafiyya (Bulaq: Dar al-Tiba a al-Khidiwiya, 1834), p.70; ‘Al-Insan Madani bil-Tab ’, al-Riyad al-Misriyya, 21 September (1888), pp.57–60. The concept of falsafa acquired, in Arab and Islamic contexts, a variety of meanings. I use falsafa here to indicate the Arabic-speaking scholars who were influenced by the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions of thought and perceived themselves as falasifa, the followers of the Greek philosophers. For more details about the use of falsafa in Arab Islamic history, see R. Arnaldez, Falsafa in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schacht (eds), The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), pp.769–75. ( Al-Farabi, Kitab al-Siyasa al-Madaniyya (Beirut: al-Matba a al-Kathulikiyya, 1998), pp.70, 88; Al-Farabi Fusul alMadani: Aphorisms of the Statesman, trans. D.M. Dunlop (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1961), pp.28, 46, 104–5, 130. Al-Farabi, Fusul al-Madani, pp.37, 117; Al-Farabi, Kitab al-Siyasa al-Madaniyya, pp.69, 87–101. For the translation of these two titles, I followed Oliver Leaman’s translation. O. Leaman, Ibn Miskawayh in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds), History of Islamic Philosophy (London, UK: Routledge, 1996), pp.466–76. In Ibn Miskawayh’s words: ‘the state of savagery [tawahhush], which is the opposite of civilization [tamaddun]’. For the Arabic source and English translation, see Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq wa-Tathir al( A raq (Beirut: Dar al-Sadir, 1968), p.109; Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, trans. C. Zurayk (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1968), p.150. Leaman, ‘Ibn Miskawayh’, p.469; Ibn Miskawayh, Kitab al-Fawz al-Asghar (Beirut, 1901), pp.7–13, 100–107; Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, pp.88–92; Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp.40–1, 53–54. Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, p.64; Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, p.55; B. Bhat, Miskawayh on Society and Government, Islamic Studies Vol.24, No.1 (1985), pp.33–6. The link between nature, political life, good society and the perception of cultural superiority had been articulated by Aristotle. He believed that through political life men practice their nature and that this manifested in what they did together as citizens. He argued that those who do not act politically are not humans – they are either animals or gods. Aristotle, Politics, trans. E. Barker (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.7. Richard Kraut provides further details of Aristotle’s concept of politics: R. Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.240–76. For the Arabic source and its English translation, see Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp.28–9; Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, p.25. See also Ibn Miskawayh, Kitab al-Fawz al-Asghar, p.62–5. Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, p.109; Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, p.150. Ibn Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character, p.36–7. M. Arkoun, L’humanisme Arabe Au IVe/Xe Siecle: Miskawayh, Philosophe et Historien (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1962); Leaman, ‘Ibn Miskawayh’, p.472; E.I. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1962), p.14. For more details on Ibn Miskawayh’s biography and service under the Buwayhids, see S. Khan, ‘Miskawayh and the Buwayhids’, Oriens Vol.21 (1968), pp.235–47. Averroes presents a similar definition of civilization. See Averroes, Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, trans. E.I. Rosenthal and S.B. Yehuda (Cambridge,( UK: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp.22, 113. ( ( Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar iyya fi Islah al-Ra i wal-Ra iyya (Riyadh: Maktabat Nizar al-Mustafa al-Baz, 2004), p.118. Al-Ghazali also makes limited use of the philosophers’ ideas regarding the importance of( human association and organization. He argues that the source( of these ideas is the religious sciences (‘al- ulum al( shar iyya’) which are ( completed by political science (‘al- ulum al-siyasiyya’). See al-Ghazali, Maqasid al-Falasifa (Damascus: Matba at al-Sabah, 2000), pp.61–3. Ibn Taymiyya, p.118–9. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. F. (Rosenthal, Vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.343–7; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat al- Allama Ibn Khaldun (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2004), pp.184–6. ( Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol 1, p.84; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat al- Allama Ibn Khaldun, p.53. For an English translation and the Arabic sources, see Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. F.( Rosenthal, Vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.137–8; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat al- Allama Ibn Khaldun, p.318. 682 ( W. ABU- UKSA 31. Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp.94–5; Leaman, ‘Ibn Miskawayh’, p.473. 32. For works written on the question of the origins of tamaddun, see Schaebler, ‘Civilizing Others’, pp.3–31; Benlahcene, ‘Civilization in the Western and Islamic Cultural Traditions’, pp.49–64. ( 33. For more details on the idea of progress in nineteenth-century Arabic, see W. Abu- Uksa, Freedom in the Arab World: Concepts and Ideologies in Arabic Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.54–72. ( 34. R.R. al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz aw ( al-Diwan al-Nafis Bi-Iwan Baris (Bulaq: Dar al-Tiba a alKhidiwiyya, 1834), pp. 6–7, 67–8; Al-Tahtawi, al-Ta ribat al-Shafiya, p. 67. 35. al-Tahtawi, Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin, pp. 806–7. 36. It is worth noting that al-Tahtawi did not mention al-Farabi in the first edition of his account of his journey to Paris (published in 1834). He added a few paragraphs about al-Farabi to the second edition which he published in 1849. For comparison, see al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-Ibriz, p.61; R.R. al-Tahtawi, Al-Diwan al-Nafis fi ( Iwan Baris aw, Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz (Beirut: Dar al-Suwaydi lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi , 2002), pp.107–9. 37. Al-Ghazali used these two( words )in his) critique of philosophy. See al-Ghazali, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal in (A. ( Shams al-Din (ed.), Majmu at Rasa il al- Imam al-Ghazali (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al- Almiyya, 1998), pp.34–47; A. A. al-Sharqawi, Tuhfat al-Nazirin fi-man Waliya Misr min al-Muluk wal-Salatin (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1996), ( p.122; A. al-R. al-Jabarti, Mazhar al-Taqdis Bi-Zawal Dawlat al-Faransis (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1998), ( pp.27–8; H. al-Shihabi, Qisat Ahmad Basha al-Jazzar Bayna Misr wal-Sham wa-Hawadithuhu Ma Nabulyun Bunabart (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2008), pp.143–51. ( 38. For comparison with al-Farabi, see al-Farabi, Fusul al-Madani, pp.37, 117; Al-Tahtawi, al-Ta ribat al-Shafiya, p.3; Al-Tahtawi, Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin, p.458. ( 39. I followed Juan Cole for the translation of this title. See J.R. Cole, ‘Rifa a al-Tahtawi and the Revival of Practical Philosophy’, The Muslim World Vol.70, No.1 (1980), pp.30–5. ( ( 40. See, for instance, R.R. al-Tahtawi, Kitab ( ( ( Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya fi Mabahij al-Adab al- Asriyya in M. Imara (ed.), al-A mal al-Kamila li-Rifa a Rafi al-Tahtawi, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2010), pp.379–80; Ibn Miskawayh, ( Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp.55–6. For a detailed comparison of two sources, see Cole, ‘Rifa a al-Tahtawi’, pp. 29–46. ( 41. Al-Tahtawi, Kitab Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya, p.371; Cole, ‘Rifa a al-Tahtawi’, pp.29–35. 42. Al-Tahtawi, Kitab Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya, pp.309–12. 43. Al-Tahtawi, Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin, pp.508–10, 513. ) ( ( 44. For his ideas about tamaddun, see B.( al-Bustani, Tamaddun, Kitab Da irat al-Ma arif (Beirut: Dar al-Ma arif,) ( 1882), pp.213–5; B. al-Bustani, al-Jam iyya al-Suriyya lil- Ulum wal-Funun, 1847–1852 (Beirut: Dar al-Hamra , 1990), pp.45–53. ( 45. F. al-Marrash, Ghabat al-Haqq (Beirut: Matba at al-Qidis Jawirjius, 1881), pp.6–20. 46. Al-Marrash, pp.36–9. ( ( ( 47. A. Ishaq, Wali Watan Alayt an la Abi ahu in N. Alush (ed.) Adib Ishaq: al-Kitabat al-Siyasiyya wal-Ijtima iyya ( (Beirut: Dar al-Tali a, 1978),) p.80. 48. al-Shidyaq, Kanz al-Ragha ib, vol 1, pp.3–4; al-Shidyaq, Mukhtarat min Athar Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, pp.91–2, 108–24, 134, 154. 49. Al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-Ibriz, pp.19, 35. ) 50. S. al-Bustani, ‘Umm al-Dunya’, al-Jinan, 11 (1870), pp.321–22; Al-Ahram, 10 July 1879; Al-Jawa ib, 27 September 1876, p.5. ( 51. Al-Tahtawi, Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin, pp.317–8; K. al-D. al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-Masalik fi Ma rifat Ahwal al) ( Mamalik in M. Ziyada (ed.) (Beirut: al-Mu assasa al-Jami iyya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr, 1985), p.200. 52. Many published works have dealt extensively with the intellectual aspects of al-Tahtawi’s and al-Bustani’s work. See A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.67–102; B. Abu-Manneh, ‘The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani’, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol.11, No.3 (1980), pp.287–304; S.P. Sheehi, Inscribing the Arab Self: Butrus al-Bustani and Paradigms of Subjective Reform, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol.27, No.1 (2000), pp.7–24; J.W. Livingston, ‘Western Science and Educational Reform in the Thought of Shaykh Rifaa al-Tahtawi’, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol.28, No.4 (1996), pp.543–64. 53. The introduction to the book Aqwam al-masalik by the famous reformer Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi was written in defense of the Tanzimat. See Faris al-Shidyaq’s review of this work and the ‘requests’ he received to publish ) parts of its introduction in his newspaper in defense of the first Ottoman Parliament: Al-Jawa ib, 12 July 1876, ( ( p.4; K. al-D. al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-Masalik fi Ma rifat Ahwal al-Mamalik (Tunis: Matba at al-Dawla bi-Hadirat Tunis, 1867). ( 54. ‘Al-Insan Madani bil-Tab ’, pp.57–60. 55. For examples of the use of watani in the nineteenth century by and after al-Tahtawi, see al-Tahtawi, Kitab) al) Murshid al-Amin, p.457; Al-Jawa ib, 22 June 1875; Al-Ahram, 18 October 1878; B. al-Bustani, ‘Rusu’, Kitab Da irat ( al-Ma arif (Beirut: al-Adabiyya, 1887), p.2.